Teorías bioéticas, protección de la vida y ley natural / Bioethics theories, the protection of life and natural law

La bioética principialista de Beauchamp y Childress se ha hecho con un lugar preeminente en la Bioética actual. No obstante, presenta algunas carencias teóricas importantes: falta de elaboración de algunos conceptos, tendencia al relativismo moral, etc. Entre los múltiples posicionamientos éticos alternativos actuales desde los cuales cubrir tales carencias, pensamos que el más adecuado es la teoría de la ley natural. Esta ofrece una reflexión argumentada sobre el bien y los bienes humanos y sobre su relación con los principios morales generales. Desde tales bienes, dicha teoría sostiene la existencia de acciones que son siempre maleficentes, esto es, acciones intrínsecamente y universalmente malas. El artículo aplica la teoría de la ley natural a temas relacionados con la protección de la vida humana (aborto, eutanasia, legítima defensa y manipulación genética)

Principlist Bioethics by Beauchamp and Childress has reached a prominent status in contemporary Bioethics. Nevertheless, it includes some important theoretical problems: some lacks when defining some concepts, a tendency to ethical relativism, etc. Among the ethical alternative approaches from which such problems can be solved, we think that the most appropiate is the Natural Law theory. It offers a reasoned reflection on the concept of good and on human basic goods and their relation with moral general principles. From such goods, this ethical theory supports the existence of actions that are always maleficent acts, that is, intrinsically and universally evil acts. The article applies the Natural Law theory to issues related to the protection of human life (abortion, euthanasia, self-defense and genetic manipulation)

Provider Conscientious Refusal of Abortion, Obstetrical Emergencies, and Criminal Homicide Law.

Catholic doctrine's strict prohibition on abortion can lead clinicians or institutions to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion, although a legal duty to provide abortion would apply to anyone who refused. Conscientious refusals by clinicians to end a pregnancy can constitute murder or reckless homicide under American law if a woman dies as a result of such a refusal. Such refusals are not immunized from criminal liability by the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion or by statutes that confer immunity from criminal homicide prosecution. Core principles of the rule of law require the state to protect the lives of all persons equally and to place the life and health of persons above any the interests of providers have in moral integrity or in respecting the moral status of prenatal humans. In some states criminal liability related to conscientious objection also applies to corporate hospital officials.

El aborto como un bien social / Abortion as a social good / L'avortament entès com un bé social

Se analiza al aborto como un bien social examinando las distintas miradas que tiene la sociedad con respecto al aborto y sus leyes. Se critica la posición de los distintos actores sociales con respecto a la posición de la Iglesia o la posición de aquellos que están a favor de la vida. Estos no deberían estar influenciados por sus creencias personales sino por la necesidad de la población y la de políticas públicas. Se analiza la necesidad de despenalización del aborto por motivos de salud pública y de dignidad de las mujeres

Abortion is analyzed as a social good. This article considers the different views society has regarding abortion and its regulation. The positions of different social actors are criticized, when related to the view of the Catholic Church or prolife positions, for social actors should not be influenced by their personal beliefs but by the requirements of public policy and people's needs. The need of de-penalizing abortion is defended based on public health and women's dignity

S'analitza l'avortament com un bé social des de les diferents mirades que té la societat pel que fa a l'avortament i les lleis que ho regulen. Es critica la posició dels diferents actors socials pel que fa a la posició de l'Església o la d'aquells que estan a favor de la vida. Aquests actors no haurien d'estar influenciats per les seves creences personals sinó per les necessitats de la població i de les polítiques públiques. S'estudia la necessitat de despenalitzar l'avortament per motius de salut pública i de la dignitat de les dones

Caso Esperancita: hacia un estándar legal mínimo de aborto terapéutico en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos / Esperancita Case: towards a minimum legal standard on therapeutic abortion in the Interamerican System of Human Rights / Cas Esperancita: cap a un estàndard legal mínim d'avortament terapèutic en el Sistema Interamericà de Drets Humans

El presente artículo describe la estrategia jurídica utilizada en el caso de Rosaura Almonte (Esperancita) vs. República Dominicana ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Se argumenta que el artículo 4 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (CADH), que consagra el derecho a la vida, establece que los Estados, en cumplimiento de sus obligaciones, deben permitir como mínimo el aborto terapéutico. A partir de un análisis de los métodos de interpretación establecidos en la Convención de Viena sobre Derecho de los Tratados y su aplicación en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, resulta admisible establecer que el artículo 4 de la CADH protege la vida y salud de la mujer embarazada cuando se encuentren en riesgo

This paper describes the legal strategy used in the case of Rosaura Almonte (Esperancita) vs. the Dominican Republic before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This argues that Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), which enshrines the right to life, establishes that States, in compliance with their obligations, should allow at least therapeutic abortion. Indeed, based on an analysis of the methods of interpretation established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and their application in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, it is admissible to establish that Article 4 of the ACHR protects the life and health of the pregnant woman when they are at risk

El present article descriu l'estratègia jurídica utilitzada en el cas de Rosaura Almonte (Esperancita) vs. la República Dominicana davant la Comissió Interamericana de Drets Humans. S'argumenta que l'article 4 de la Convenció Americana de Drets Humans (CADH), que consagra el dret a la vida, estableix que els Estats, en compliment de les seves obligacions, han de permetre com a mínim l'avortament terapèutic. A partir d'una anàlisi dels mètodes d'interpretació establerts en la Convenció de Viena sobre Dret dels Tractats i la seva aplicació al Sistema Interamericà de Drets Humans, resulta admissible establir que l'article 4 de la CADH protegeix la vida i salut de la dona embarassada quan es trobin en risc

Políticas públicas de aborto en transición: de las consejerías pre y post aborto a las interrupciones legales del embarazo en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires / Abortion policy in transition: from pre and post abortion counseling to legal interruptions of pregnancy at Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires / Polítiques públiques d'avortament en transició: de les conselleries pre i post avortament a la interrupció legal de l'embaràs a l'Àrea Metropolitana de Buenos Aires

En este artículo, analizamos la transición desde el modelo de consejerías pre y post aborto hacia la implementación de las interrupciones legales del embarazo (ILE) en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires. Mientras el primer modelo se enmarca en el paradigma de la reducción de riesgos y daños, la implementación de las interrupciones legales del embarazo resignifica como un derecho las causales de no punibilidad contempladas en el Código Penal argentino de 1921, a saber: la causal violación y la causal salud. En este trabajo, analizamos en qué contexto se produce esta transición, cuáles han sido los factores que han contribuido y qué diferencias supone este cambio de modelo

In this paper, we analyze the transition from pre and post abortion-counseling model to the implementation of legal interruptions of pregnancy (ILE, for its Spanish initials) in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires. Whereas the first model is framed in the paradigm of risk and harm reduction, the implementation of legal interruptions of pregnancy resignifies as a right the cases of non-punishable abortion included at the Argentine Penal Code of 1921, namely: cases of rape and cases of maternal health or life risk. In this paper, we analyze in which context this transition takes place, which factors have contributed and what differences this change of model implies

En aquest article analitzem la transició des del model de conselleries pre i post avortament cap a la implementació de la interrupció legal de l'embaràs (ILE) a l'Àrea Metropolitana de Buenos Aires. Mentre el primer model s'emmarca en el paradigma de la reducció de riscos i danys, la implementació de la interrupció legal de l'embaràs estableix com un dret els supòsits de no punibilitat contemplades en el Codi Penal argentí de 1921, a saber: el supòsit de violació i el supòsit de salut. En aquest treball, analitzem en quin context es produeix aquesta transició, quins han estat els factors que hi han contribuït i quines diferències suposa aquest canvi de model

Microcefalia fetal asociada a virus del Zika y aborto. Consideraciones éticas no explicadas a propósito de un artículo / Zika virus associated with microcephaly and abortion, ethical procedures unexplained in relation to an article

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Las interrupciones del embarazo en la práctica obstétrica: recurso terapéutico vs aborto provocado / Discontinuation of pregnancy in obstetric practice: therapeutic resource versus provoked abortion / As interrupções da gravidez na prática obstétrica: recurso terapêutico vs aborto provocado

En el tema del aborto provocado, en general, y del aborto llamado "terapéutico" en particular, se involucran valores importantes para los individuos y para toda la población. Existe mucha confusión respecto de los términos empleados para nominar las distintas acciones que los médicos obstetras deciden realizar en las situaciones clínicas que presentan sus pacientes. Este trabajo pretende precisar cuáles interrupciones de un embarazo corresponden a acciones no solamente lícitas sino obligatorias para un médico, por corresponder a los fines de la medicina, y cuáles son abortos provocados. Para ello se analiza el fin de la profesión médica y a quienes debe el profesional de la salud otorgar siempre sus cuidados. Realiza una reflexión sobre la diferencia entre concepto, criterios y signos para distinguirlos cuando hablamos de viabilidad fetal y de aborto provocado. Desde esa perspectiva, establece el concepto de aborto provocado, buscando sus rasgos necesarios y evitando la confusión con los criterios y signos utilizados para reconocer esa realidad en un caso particular. Finalmente, deduce los criterios y signos de una interrupción de un embarazo en armonía con los valores de la medicina.

The issue of induced abortion, in general, and the called therapeutic abortion in particular, has generated a lot of concern for both the medical profession, as well as for all society. They involve important values for individuals and for the entire population. There is much confusion about the terms used to nominate the various actions that the obstetricians decide to implement in clinical situations that their patients present. This paper aims to clarify which pregnancy interruptions are not only permissible but obligatory actions to a doctor, and correspond to the goals of medicine, and which of them are really induced abortions. To do so, the purpose of the medical profession is analyzed and to whom the health professional should always provide their care. Performs a reflection on the difference between concept, criteria, and signs to distinguish them when talking about fetal viability and induced abortion. From that perspective, establishes the concept of induced abortion, seeking its necessary features and avoiding confusion with the criteria and signs used to recognize this reality in a particular case. Finally, follows which are the criteria and signs of a termination of pregnancy in agreement with the values of medicine.

No tema do aborto provocado, em geral, e do aborto chamado "terapêutico" em particular, se envolvem valores importantes para os individuos e para toda a população. Existe muita confusão a respeito dos termos empregados para nominar as distintas ações que os médicos obstetras decidem realizar nas situações clínicas que apresentam as suas pacientes. Este trabalho pretende precisar quais interrupções de uma gravidez correspondem a ações não somente lícitas senão obrigatórias para um médico, por corresponder aos fins da medicina, e quais são abortos provocados. Para isso se analisa o fim da profissão médica e a quem deve o profissional da saúde outorgar sempre os seus cuidados. Realiza uma reflexão sobre a diferença entre conceito, critérios e sinais para distingui-los quando falamos de viabilidade fetal e de aborto provocado. A partir dessa perspectiva, estabelece o conceito de aborto provocado, buscando seus traços necessários e evitando a confusão com os critérios e sinais utilizados para reconhecer essa realidade num caso particular. Finalmente, deduz os critérios e sinais de uma interrupção de uma gravidez em harmonia com os valores da medicina.

Aproximación ética científica al doble efecto o único bien posible en el aborto terapéutico / Scientific ethical approach to double effect or only possible good in therapeutic abortion / Aproximação ética científica ao duplo efeito ou único bem possível no aborto terapêutico

El estudio muestra como la doctrina o principio del doble efecto (DDE) de una acción con efecto secundario negativo no puede aplicarse a todos los casos de aborto terapéutico (AT). Con el análisis de las causas e indicación de AT se demuestra que solo algunos de estos corresponden a DDE. Cuando no es el feto el que lleva a la madre a tener un embarazo de alto riesgo con amenaza de daño severo o muerte para ella, el caso puede adscribirse a la DDE; cuando es el feto directa o indirectamente el que causa a lleva a ese riesgo materno, el caso no se adscribe a la DDE. Si el feto es la causa de la muerte inminente de la madre, la remoción de la causa, que es la terapia adecuada, coincide con matarlo; entonces la acción buena (salvar a la madre tratándola causalmente) es la misma que la mala (matar al feto), situación que no puede asimilarse sea a la DDE o a la doctrina del mal menor. Más aún, decidir no interrumpir el embarazo produciría la muerte de la madre y el feto. El caso debería adscribirse al principio del único bien posible.

This study shows the inapplicability of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to all the cases of therapeutic abortion (TA). The causes of the maternal risk define cases that cannot be included in the DDE. When it is not the embryo or fetus that produces the mother pathology the case can be assigned to the DDE. When the embryo or fetus produces directly or indirectly the process that threatens the mother’s life the case cannot be assigned to the DDE. If the fetus is the cause of the imminent mother’s death, the removal of the cause, that is the proper therapy, coincides with killing him or her; then the good action (to save therapeutically the mother) is the same to the bad action (to kill the fetus) and this situation cannot be assimilated either to the DDE or to the doctrine of the lesser evil. Deciding not to kill the fetus will produce the death of the mother and the fetus. So this situation should be ascribed to the principle of the unique possible well.

O estudo mostra como a doutrina ou princípio do duplo efeito (DDE) de uma ação com efeito secundário negativo não pode aplicar-se a todos os casos de aborto terapêutico (AT). Com a análise das causas e indicação de AT se demonstra que só alguns destes correspondem a DDE. Quando não é o feto que leva a mãe a ter uma gravidez de alto risco com ameaça de dano severo ou morte para ela, o caso pode circunscrever-se à DDE; quando é o feto direta ou indiretamente quem causa ou leva a esse risco materno, o caso não se circunscreve a DDE. Se o feto é a causa da morte iminente da mãe, a remoção da causa, que é a terapia adequada, coincide em matá-lo; então a ação boa (salvar a mãe tratando-a causalmente) é a mesma que a má (matar o feto), situação que não pode assimilar-se à DDE ou à doutrina do mal menor. Mais ainda, decidir não interromper a gravidez produziria a morte da mãe e do feto. O caso deveria circunscrever-se ao princípio do único bem possível.

Maternal-fetal medicine specialists' experiences of conducting feticide as part of termination of pregnancy: a qualitative study.

OBJECTIVES: This study aimed to explore maternal-fetal medicine specialists' experiences of conducting feticide in late termination of pregnancy. METHODS: Participants were recruited via email. Purposeful sampling resulted in ten maternal-fetal specialists. Semistructured interviews were used to examine their experiences of conducting feticide. Interviews occurred across four English National Health Service hospitals. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was used. RESULTS: An ongoing doctor-patient relationship when conducting feticide facilitated participants' self-image as clinicians rather than technicians. Coping involved rationalisation, with feticide viewed as 'part of the job'. Supportive team relationships helped keep emotional expression within control. Participants were not distressed if they felt, through relationship-based decision-making, that the feticide aligned with their values and legal interpretation. To avoid negative judgements, they disclosed selectively, only telling trusted individuals that they conducted feticides. CONCLUSIONS: Participants experienced conducting feticides as difficult but necessary, eliciting pride from the skills involved. Some noted management of personal distress. Optimal conditions were involvement in the process from the initial decision-making and team support. Providing feticides was deemed as potentially stigmatising, with selective disclosure employed. Training in managing feticides and guidance on providing optimal service conditions may decrease selectivity of disclosures and enhance staff well-being and the quality of feticide provisions. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Controversies and considerations regarding the termination of pregnancy for foetal anomalies in Islam.

BACKGROUND: Approximately one-fourth of all the inhabitants on earth are Muslims. Due to unprecedented migration, physicians are often confronted with cultures other than their own that adhere to different paradigms. DISCUSSION: In Islam, and most religions, abortion is forbidden. Islam is considerably liberal concerning abortion, which is dependent on (i) the threat of harm to mothers, (ii) the status of the pregnancy before or after ensoulment (on the 120th day of gestation), and (iii) the presence of foetal anomalies that are incompatible with life. Considerable variation in religious edicts exists, but most Islamic scholars agree that the termination of a pregnancy for foetal anomalies is allowed before ensoulment, after which abortion becomes totally forbidden, even in the presence of foetal abnormalities; the exception being a risk to the mother's life or confirmed intrauterine death. SUMMARY: The authors urge Muslim law makers to also consider abortion post ensoulment if it is certain that the malformed foetus will decease soon after birth or will be severely malformed and physically and mentally incapacitated after birth to avoid substantial hardship that may continue for years for mothers and family members. The authors recommend that an institutional committee governed and monitored by a national committee make decisions pertaining to abortion to ensure that ethics are preserved and mistakes are prevented. Anomalous foetuses must be detected at the earliest possible time to enable an appropriate medical intervention prior to the 120th day.

[Terminations of pregnancy for maternal indications in the Paris area: a retrospective multicenter study in the period between the 2001 French law on termination of pregnancy and the new bioethics law]. / Interruptions médicales de grossesse pour motifs maternels : étude rétrospective multicentrique des indications dans la période entre la loi sur l'interruption de grossesse de 2001 et la nouvelle loi de bioéthique.

OBJECTIVE: To analyze the reasons for terminations of pregnancy (TOP) in cases of "severe jeopardy of the woman's health" beyond the limit of 14weeks, performed under the 2001 French law on abortion which extended these indications, until a new bioethics law was promulgated in 2011. METHODS: A retrospective observational study of all TOP performed for maternal indications (excluding premature membrane rupture), following a medical decision, from 2001 to 2010 in four academic maternity units in northern Paris. RESULTS: One hundred and three patients were included. The incidence was approximately 1 per 1000 births. The mean gestational age at the time of the TOP was 21.5weeks (range 7.7-34.7); 7% occurred before 14weeks and 35% after 24weeks. Indications were: (1) maternal diseases (22%), (2) psychosocial indications (21%) in majority multiple drug addictions, (3) psychiatric indications (21%), (4) obstetrical complications (mainly preeclampsia) before fetal viability (20%) and (5) rape (16%) mostly on minors. In 16% of cases, several indications were associated. CONCLUSION: TOP for maternal indications remains exceptional, including for psychosocial indications. Our findings suggest that the French law on TOP was not misused in these centers to permit abortion on demand beyond the limit of 14weeks.

Termination of pregnancy as emergency obstetric care: the interpretation of Catholic health policy and the consequences for pregnant women: an analysis of the death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland and similar cases.

Issues arising from the death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland in October 2012 include the question of whether it is unethical to refuse to terminate a non-viable pregnancy when the woman's life may be at risk. In Catholic maternity services, this decision intersects with health professionals' interpretation of Catholic health policy on treatment of miscarriage as well as the law on abortion. This paper explores how these issues came together around Savita's death and the consequences for pregnant women and maternity services worldwide. It discusses cases not only in Ireland but also the Americas. Many of the events presented are recent, and most of the sources are media and individual reports. However, there is a very worrying common thread across countries and continents. If further research unearths more cases like Savita's, any Catholic health professionals and/or hospitals refusing to terminate a pregnancy as emergency obstetric care should be stripped of their right to provide maternity services. In some countries these are the main or only existing maternity services. Even so, governments should refuse to fund these services, and either replace them with non-religious services or require that non-religious staff are available at all times specifically to take charge of such cases to prevent unnecessary deaths. At issue is whether a woman's life comes first or not at all.

Late abortion. Attitudes amongst young physicians in Romania.

PURPOSE: The main purpose of this article is to analyze the way in which young physicians analyze and address the issue of therapeutic abortion. METHODS: A multi-institutional survey was conducted using an online questionnaire containing 10 items. RESULTS: Most respondents agreed with therapeutic abortion (1) if the fetus is not yet viable and the mother is put at immediate risk by the continuation of the pregnancy, and (2) when the pregnancy is over 14 weeks and the prenatal screening identifies a very severe malformation. The lowest rate of acceptance was obtained by the option to terminate the pregnancy after 14 weeks for a minor malformation (polydactyly). The vast majority agreed that the OG physician should be permitted to refuse an abortion on moral grounds, even if permitted by law. CONCLUSIONS: Our study reveals that the main reasons for conducting therapeutic abortion (TA) in the 2nd or 3rd trimester are: (1) if the mother is put in immediate risk by the continuation of the pregnancy and (2) if the congenital anomaly is extremely severe. Even though the number of respondents considering Down syndrome to be a congenital malformation severe enough to allow TA, the value much lower compared with other low and middle income countries. The main reasons for refusing TA in the 2nd or 3rd trimester are the presence of a minor congenital anomaly or if it is against the moral principles of the physician.

Towards a new procreation ethic: the exemplary instance of cleft lip and palate.

The improvement of ultrasound scan techniques is enabling ever earlier prenatal diagnosis of developmental anomalies. In France, apart from cases where the mother's life is endangered, the detection of "particularly serious" conditions, and conditions that are "incurable at the time of diagnosis" are the only instances in which a therapeutic abortion can be performed, this applying up to the 9th month of pregnancy. Thus numerous conditions, despite the fact that they cause distress or pain or are socially disabling, do not qualify for therapeutic abortion, despite sometimes pressing demands from parents aware of the difficulties in store for their child and themselves, in a society that is not very favourable towards the integration and self-fulfilment of people with a disability. Cleft lip and palate (CLP), although it can be completely treated, is one of the conditions that considerably complicates the lives of child and parents. Nevertheless, the recent scope for making very early diagnosis of CLP, before the deadline for legal voluntary abortion, has not led to any wave of abortions. CLP in France has the benefit of a exceptional care plan, targeting both the health and the integration of the individuals affected. This article sets out, via the emblematic instance of CLP, to show how present fears of an emerging "domestic" or liberal eugenic trend could become redundant if disability is addressed politically and medically, so that individuals with a disability have the same social rights as any other citizen.

University students' attitudes towards Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy.

An evaluation of the future professional trends was performed by analyzing the attitudes of university students to the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy (VIP). An anonymous questionnaire was distributed to 300 students (Medicine, Nursing and Law) of the University of Santiago de Compostela, with questions on their personal beliefs, opinion on the law and intention to participate in VIP. Of the 245 respondents (response rate 82%), 66.5% were pro-abortion and their attitudes towards VIP were consistent with their opinion on the beginning of life and with the ethical arguments related to the fetus and the mother. No differences were found with age, sex or degree. The students showed to be well informed on the VIP law, and the majority of them considered unsuitable termination of pregnancy in minors without parental consent. Students' intentions to take part in abortion provision were influenced by their views on abortion, level of participation and circumstances of pregnancy. Although the majority of participants would be willing to perform VIP in situations that affect fetus and mother's life or health (87-66%), their intentions clearly diminished in other situations, such as abortion on demand (17%). These data suggest that conscientious objection of health professionals can even increase with the new policy, a fact that might affect VIP availability. It is important to stress the need of ethical training to help in the solution of conflicts between patient and health professional values.

Double effect, all over again: the case of Sister Margaret McBride.

As media reports have made widely known, in November 2009, the ethics committee of St. Joseph's Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, permitted the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus in order to save the life of its mother. This woman was suffering from acute pulmonary hypertension, which her doctors judged would prove fatal for both her and her previable child. The ethics committee believed abortion to be permitted in this case under the so-called principle of double effect, but Thomas J. Olmsted, the bishop of Phoenix, disagreed with the committee and pronounced its chair, Sister Margaret McBride, excommunicated latae sententiae, "by the very commission of the act." In this article, I take the much discussed Phoenix case as an occasion to subject the principle of double effect to another round of philosophical scrutiny. In particular, I examine the third condition of the principle in its textbook formulation, namely, that the evil effect in question may not be the means to the good effect. My argument, in brief, is that the textbook formulation of the principle does not withstand philosophical scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the end, I do not claim that we should then "do away" with the principle altogether. Instead, we do well to understand it within the context of casuistry, the tradition of moral reasoning from which it issued.

Límites en la interrupción avanzada del embarazo / Limits to the late interruption of pregnancy

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